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Reuven Avi-Yonah*
Do Lawyers Need Economists? Review of
Katja Langenbucher, Economic Transplants:
On Lawmaking for Corporations and Capital
Markets (Cambridge U. Press, 2017)
https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2020-0018
Abstract: Katja Langenbucher’s outstanding book seeks to address the
question of why and in what ways have lawyers been importing economic
theories into a legal environment, and how has this shaped scholarly
research, judicial and legislative work? Since the financial crisis, corporate or
capital markets law has been the focus of attention by academia and media.
Formal modelling has been used to describe how capital markets work and,
later, has been criticized for its abstract assumptions. Empirical legal studies
and regulatory impact assessments offered different ways forward. This
excellent book presents a new approach to the risks and benefits of interdis-
ciplinary policy work. The benefits economic theory brings for reliable
and tested lawmaking are contrasted with important challenges including
the significant differences of research methodology, leading to mis-
understandings and problems of efficient implementation of economic theo-
ry’s findings into the legal world. Katja Langenbucher’s innovative research
scrutinizes the potential of economic theory to European legislators faced
with a lack of democratic accountability.
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Katja Langenbucher’s outstanding book seeks to address the question of why and
in what ways have lawyers been importing economic theories into a legal envi-
ronment, and how has this shaped scholarly research, judicial and legislative
work? Since the financial crisis, corporate or capital markets law has been the
focus of attention by academia and media. Formal modelling has been used to
describe how capital markets work and, later, has been criticized for its abstract
assumptions. Empirical legal studies and regulatory impact assessments offered
different ways forward. This excellent book presents a new approach to the risks
*Corresponding author: Reuven Avi-Yonah, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA,
E-mail: aviyonah@umich.edu
Account. Econ. Law 2020; ▪▪▪(▪▪▪): 20200018
© 2020 CONVIVIUM, association loi de 1901
and benefits of interdisciplinary policy work. The benefits economic theory brings
for reliable and tested lawmaking are contrasted with important challenges
including the significant differences of research methodology, leading to mis-
understandings and problems of efficient implementation of economic theory’s
findings into the legalworld. Katja Langenbucher’s innovative research scrutinizes
the potential of economic theory to European legislators faced with a lack of
democratic accountability.
I would like to address the question whether economic theory and modeling
are useful for lawyers by focusing on another field, tax law,where economists have
been very influential. Many US law schools now have economists with no law
degree teaching tax law, and several of the leading younger tax law professors at
top schools have economics PhDs as well as JDs.
However, I have some doubts whether economic theory is really useful for
tax law (as opposed to empirical research, where lawyers can learn from
econometric analyses of data). Let me give one example. The US until 2017 has
always taxed US persons (both corporations and individuals) on their worldwide
income “from whatever source derived”, as permitted by the US Constitution
(Amendment XVI), because that was the best measure of ability to pay. But a
problem arose in the 1930s because rich US individuals would transfer their
foreign source income to “incorporated pocketbooks”, i.e., shell corporations
that they controlled in tax havens. For example, Colonel Jacob Schick, who
invented the electric razor in the army, transferred his patent to a shell in the
Bahamas, then gave up his US citizenship in 1935 andmoved to Canada to live out
his retirement (he died in 1937).
Congress responded by enacting the “foreign personal holding corporation”
regime that taxed individual US shareholders in foreign corporations they
controlled if over 60% of the corporations’ income was passive (dividends, inter-
est, capital gains or royalties). There was no economic theory involved: It was a
pure question of fairness, since it was considered unfair for rich people not to pay
tax on suchmobile incomewhile domesticwage earnerswere taxed at rates as high
as 94%.
In the 1960s, the Kennedy Administration decided to apply a similar regime to
the income of foreign corporations controlled by US corporate parents – i.e., to
“controlled foreign corporations” or CFCs. However, this time the rationale given
was not fairness (despite the unfairness of taxing domestic corporations but not
CFCs) but rather “capital export neutrality” (CEN), an economic theory invented by
Peggy Musgrave in the 1950s. Stanley Surrey, who was the first Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury for Tax Policy, liked working with economists and was a close
friend of Richard Musgrave, his Harvard colleague and Peggy’s husband. Surrey
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decided invoking CENwas amore “scientific” justification than fairness, although
in general he cared deeply about fairness in the tax code.1
CEN stood for the idea that it is inefficient not to tax CFCs because that violated
“export neutrality” by creating an incentive to invest overseas rather than in the
US.2 Until the 1990s, it was the guiding principle of US international taxation.3 But
in the 1990s, the multinationals wanted to reduce their taxes on foreign source
income, and they got the economists to come up with a counter theory, capital
ownership neutrality (CON), which argued that it is inefficient to impose tax on
foreign source income of US CFCs if foreign countries do not do the same.4 As
Willard Taylor (a very experienced tax lawyer) has argued, CON is just a fancy
name for competitiveness.5 But CON was successful in giving cover to Congress to
ultimately (in 2017) abolish the tax on CFCs even when their income was repatri-
ated to their US parents – a blatant deviation from the “from whatever source
derived” rule.
In my opinion, the ultimate blame rests on Surrey, because it was completely
unnecessary to bring the economic concepts into play – the tax on CFCs could be
fully justified on fairness grounds. It is unfair to tax a domestic corporation in full
and a US corporation operating through a CFC at zero. It is also dangerous not to
tax income of CFCs because of the opportunities to shift income to them from the
US, as clearly evidenced by the $3 trillion amassed by USmultinationals in low-tax
jurisdictions between 2005 and 2017.
1 On Surrey and horizontal equity see Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. and Fishbien, Nir and Mazzoni,
Gianluca, Stanley Surrey, the Code and the Regime (July 4, 2019). U of Michigan Public Law
Research Paper No. 652. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3414965 or http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.3414965.
2 STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 90TH CONG., 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF H.R. 10650, 87TH CONG., THE REVENUE ACT OF 1962, at 126 (Comm. Print 1967) (Statement by
Hon. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury, Before the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives, on the President’sMessage on Taxation,May 3, 1961): “Either we tax the
foreign income of U.S. companies at U.S. tax rates and credit income taxes paid abroad, thereby
eliminating the tax factor in the U.S. investor’s choice between domestic and foreign investment;
or we permit foreign income to be taxed at the rates applicable abroad, thereby removing the
impact, if any, which tax rate differences may have on the competitive position of the American
investor abroad. Both types of neutrality cannot be achieved at once. I believe that reasons of tax
equity as well as reasons of economic policy clearly dictate that in the case of investment in other
industrialized countries we should give priority to tax neutrality in the choice between investment
here and investment abroad.”
3 The Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations: A Policy Study,
Office of Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury (December 2000).
4 Desai, Mihir A. and Hines, James R. Jr. (2003), Evaluating International Tax Reform, National
Tax Journal, 56:3, pp. 487-502.
5 Willard Taylor, What’s ‘Neutral’ About This? Tax Notes Int’l, May 30, 2011, p. 715.
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But there is light at the end of the tunnel: As Langenbucher also shows, after
the financial crisis, the influence of economic modes in law has diminished. In
addition, many contemporary economists follow the lead of Thomas Piketty in
advocating higher taxes on the rich and on large corporations.6 I would, however,
argue that lawyers need to be careful before relying even on these economic
models, because they do not want to follow Surrey in granting too much power to
the economists.
6 See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, The Triumph of Injustice: How the Rich Dodge
Taxes and How to Make Them Pay (2019).
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